CVE-2008-1118-漏洞详情

[原文]Timbuktu Pro 8.6.5 for Windows, and possibly 8.7 for Mac OS X, does not perform input validation before logging information fields taken from packets from a remote peer, which allows remote attackers to generate crafted log entries, and possibly avoid detection of attacks, via modified (1) computer name, (2) user name, and (3) IP address fields.

[CNNVD]Motorola Timbuktu Pro 对端消息包文伪造漏洞(CNNVD-200803-229)

        Motorola的Timbuktu Pro是一款远程控制软件，允许远程访问计算机桌面。


        Timbuktu直接从用户所发送的报文中获取了一些包含有对等端信息的字段(计算机名、用户名、IP地址等)，并在目标机器的屏幕上显示这些信息，攻击者在受害用户的日志行中伪造对等端信息。


        以下是反汇编的漏洞代码：


        /———–


        .text:6063A62E mov edx, [ebp+lp]


        .text:6063A631 mov eax, [edx+20h] ; Packet field containing filename


        .text:6063A634 push eax ; EAX is also the output buffer


        .text:6063A635 call ds:Pascal2C ; Extract filename from packet


        .text:6063A63B push '\' ; Char to filter in the filename


        .text:6063A63D mov ecx, [ebp+lp]


        .text:6063A640 mov edx, [ecx+20h]


        .text:6063A643 push edx ; Filename obtained in 0x6063A635


        .text:6063A644 call _strrchr ; Search for '\' in the filename


        .text:6063A649 add esp, 8 ; At this point, the pointer to the


         ; position of the '\' is obtained and


         ; will be stored in a local variable.


        .text:6063A64C mov [ebp+pSlashPosition], eax ; Store '\' pointer


        .text:6063A64F cmp [ebp+pSlashPosition], 0 ; This is the BUG !!!!


        .text:6063A653 jnz short loc_6063A669 ; It avoids checking '/' if


         ; '\' was found, so we must


         ; send '\' and then as much


         ; “../” as we want 🙂


        .text:6063A655 push '/' ; This check won't be done


        .text:6063A657 mov eax, [ebp+lp] ; because the '\' was found


        .text:6063A65A mov ecx, [eax+20h]


        .text:6063A65D push ecx


        .text:6063A65E call _strrchr


        .text:6063A663 add esp, 8


        .text:6063A666 mov [ebp+pSlashPosition], eax


        .text:6063A669 loc_6063A669:


        .text:6063A669 cmp [ebp+pSlashPosition], 0 ; Check if a slash was


         ;found so


        .text:6063A66D jz short loc_6063A68C ; it


        copies past it's ;position


        .text:6063A66F push 200h


        .text:6063A674 mov edx, [ebp+pSlashPosition]; Get the '\' position


        and move


        .text:6063A677 add edx, 1 ; forward 1 byte to avoid it


        .text:6063A67A push edx


        .text:6063A67B mov eax, [ebp+lp]


        .text:6063A67E add eax, 4B0h


        .text:6063A683 push eax


        .text:6063A684 call ds:lstrcpynA ; From know on, the filename


        .text:6063A68A jmp short loc_6063A6A ; contains something like


         ; ../a.exe 🙂


        . . . . .


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